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Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments
Frank H. Easterbrookt
In an ideal world people either obey all legal rules or quickly
make amends. This means keeping one's contracts or paying damages. Few protest when people obey the rules or compensate those
they injure. Those who do not do this face suits, and once sued
they may comply in whole or part (that is to say, they may settle)
or demand judgment. Injured parties by and large prefer compliance sooner to compliance later-thus the preference for obedience
over litigation.
The process of settlement is like the process of compliance
with the law. Each person must determine what the law requires,
which as a practical matter means to determine what a court faced
with the problem will declare. To comply with the law is to do
what the court would require. Settlement is the same process of
prediction from both sides: the plaintiff and the defendant each
predict what the court will do. If the predictions agree, they can
settle at once. If the predictions do not agree, they still may settle
if the value of the divergence is less than the cost both sides will
incur in obtaining the court's answer-costs that include legal fees,
the expenses of discovery, the expenses of waiting, and the uncertainty of putting the matter to a court. The settlement saves these
costs, which the parties can divide, making each better off than it
expects to be after a trial.1 If the parties do not settle at the begint Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago. I thank Barry E. Adler, Albert W. Alschuler, Douglas G. Baird, Jules
Coleman, Geoffrey Miller, Richard A. Posner, Charles Silver, Eric Simonson, David Strauss,
and Alan 0. Sykes for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
I This is a restatement of the standard economic model of settlement, which produces
similar conclusions whether or not one includes strategic conduct. The approach was developed by John Gould and William Landes. See John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. Legal Stud. 279 (1973); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts,
14 J.L. & Econ. 61 (1971). Important developments and extensions include: Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal
Stud. 399 (1973); Robert Cooter, Stephan Marks and Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. Legal Stud. 225 (1982);
George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal
Stud. 1 (1984). The best available data suggest that settlements are rational compromises in
light of the anticipated verdicts at trial, just as the economic model predicts. Patricia
Munch Danzon and Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of Medical
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ning, they may settle as discovery and interim rulings of the court
enable them to agree on the likely outcome of the case. Any legal
system that finds compliance with law attractive should find settlement of disputes attractive, for the same reasons.
Most settlements take the form of contracts. The contract
may be enforced like any other. Compliance is desirable, and there
are remedies for breach. Disputes may arise about the meaning of
the contract, especially if it is executory, novel, complex, or all
three. The parties may want to speed up the process of construing
and enforcing such a contract. Then they arrange for the entry of a
consent decree, the settlement contract in the form of a court order. When the settlement includes a court order the parties can
resolve disputes and get enforcement without filing a new suit and
starting at the end of the queue. The consent decree is different in
three ways from a private contract: the speed of enforcement, the
court of enforcement, and the remedy for breach. It is a contract
all the same. Its force comes from the parties' agreement, not from
the law that was the basis of the suit.2 So any legal system that
finds both voluntary compliance and voluntary contracts attractive
should find consent decrees attractive. (The consent decree may
have other attributes, such as preclusive effects on third parties
and enlarging the set of permissible contracts, that call into question the relation between contract and decree. I discuss these in
Part II.)
Because voluntary compliance and contracts are thought desirable, it is surprising to hear voices opposing settlements and
their embodiment in consent decrees.3 The opposing argument de-

Malpractice Claims, 12 J. Legal Stud. 345 (1983); W. Kip Viscusi, The Determinants of the
Disposition of Product Liability Claims and Compensation for Bodily Injury, 15 J. Legal
Stud. 321 (1986); Donald Wittman, The Price of Negligence Under Differing Liability Rules,
29 J.L. & Econ. 151 (1986). The considerations of strategy that Cooter, Marks and Mnookin
emphasize do not appear to block settlements or distort the terms in practice. Experimental
evidence also suggests that when bargaining is possible parties obtain the gains from trade,
which here means that they settle and save the costs of litigation. See Elizabeth Hoffman
and Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Law and Economics: An Introduction, 85 Colum. L.
Rev. 991 (1985).
I have contributed to the literature on the economic analysis of litigation in Frank H.
Easterbrook, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. & Econ. 331, 353-64 (1980); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of
Information, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 309, 356-64; Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a
Market System, 12 J. Legal Stud. 289, 297-98, 308-22, 331-32 (1983).
2 Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3073-76 (1986) (collecting
other cases).
I See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984); Jules R. Coleman
and Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, 4 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 103 (1986).
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fines the outcome of contested litigation as the "just" result. Settlements do not mimic the outcome of any given trial; the parties
compromise their differences; therefore, the settlements are not
just, and decrees implementing settlements snarl the courts in administering the details of injustice. This is an unattractive view of
settlements. There are, nonetheless, problems with consent decrees
in some kinds of cases, and Part II explores these problems.

I
Those who settle a suit get neither all they want nor exactly
what the court would have done. Settlement is compromise. Thus
the argument that the settlement is unjust. What the court would
have done is justice. Even though courts err, their decisions are as
close to the proper result as the results of any other process we are
likely to invent. We know that the results of settlements diverge
from the results of trials, ana therefore settlements are unjust.
This attack on settlements depends on the assumption that
the court's disposition is the just result. Suppose, however, we define the just result as the one likely to occur in a case, or the one
that occurs most often in a group of similar cases. Treating likes
alike is another common definition of justice. This is a reasonable
view because trials are designed in part to deal with uncertainty
that cannot be dissipated. The trial is a process for rounding a
probability that falls somewhere between 0.01 and 0.99. Probabilities greater than 0.50 ("more likely than not," the civil burden of
persuasion) are rounded up so the plaintiff wins, and the rest are
rounded down. Trials resolve uncertainty about the law and the
facts by rounding because it cannot be handled in any other way.
Many legal questions do not have answers that can be derived axiomatically, and problems the legal answers to which are debatable
are overrepresented among cases fully litigated. (Otherwise there is
likely to be compliance or quick amends.) When the facts are
kniown the disposition may be problematic. When the law is known
the facts may be problematic. People may disagree about important facts; memories may be weak; documents may conflict or escape notice. In the end the court will know less than the parties do
(because information cannot be transmitted or absorbed perfectly),
and the parties collectively will not know everything. Truth lies
beyond the realm of legal processes. So the legal system contains
rounding rules: a probability of 0.51 or more is rounded up. In a
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significant percentage of cases, the trial court's opinion begins
"The evidence in this case conflicts" and the appellate opinion
ends "The trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous." If the
court had found the facts the other way, that would not have been
clearly erroneous either.
There are at least two kinds of uncertainty. One is difficulty in
ascertaining what actually happened, and the other is difficulty in
predicting what the court will declare the law requires given the
facts. Consider the first of these. One party is "in the right" under
existing law (the defendant ran a red light or he did not), but it is
hard to tell which. Assume there are 100 cases, in each of which
the evidence cuts both ways and a careful observer would evaluate
the evidence at roughly 60/40 in the plaintiff's favor. If all of these
cases go to trial the plaintiff will win every one, because in each the
evidence preponderates for the plaintiff. The result is unjust to defendants as a group: it is exceedingly unlikely that the plaintiff is
in the right in all cases in which there is substantial evidence for
the defendant. Turn the example around. Suppose the evidence
just barely cuts for the defendant in each case. Then all plaintiffs
will lose. Again the results are not just; we know that in close cases
all-or-nothing over large numbers cannot be right. The dispositions
of many of these cases are "unjust"-but because settlements mirror the parties' expectations about what will happen at trial, the
settlements will be equally unjust. Cases in the first group may settle for close to 100 cents on the dollar, cases in the second group
for close to nothing.
Now consider the more common kind of uncertainty, which
may come from but is not limited to uncertainty about the
facts-the difficulty of predicting what the court will do. The judge
may err in finding the facts; genuine ambiguity may make decisions difficult; the law governing those facts may be unclear or may
call for an exercise of equitable judgment; and so on. The parties
may be unsure what will happen to their case, and cases that look
identical to the parties may come out differently in the end. Each
case will have a probability distribution attached to it, say with a
median that may be 0.40 or 0.60, and a dispersion of outcomes.
Think of a bell-shaped probability curve. The median may be
placed at 0.60 (implying that evidence preponderates for the plaintiff), but the dispersion of the distribution reflects uncertainty
about the outcome. The defendant will prevail in the portion of
the distribution that falls to the left of 0.50. The larger the dispersion of possible results, and the closer the median to 0.50, the more
frequently the defendant will prevail. In a population of 100 cases
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with probability distributions centered on 0.60, reflecting a preponderance but not a certainty, the plaintiffs are "in the right" 60
times. But unless the probability distribution is a horizontal line,
more than 60 percent of the curve falls to the right of 0.50. Plaintiffs will win, say, 80 percent of the time (the portion of the area
under the curve to the right of 0.50). This is still "too often" but
closer to being right on average. The "excess judgments" for the
plaintiffs in this group will be matched against a reduction in judgments when the median falls under 0.50. (If the median falls at
0.25, each plaintiff has a colorable claim and perhaps 25 percent
ought to win; but unless the dispersion is substantial, all may lose.)
Return to the group of plaintiffs with a probability distribution centered on 0.60. Eighty or so in the group will recover if there
is a trial, and given the difficulty of defining "right" and "wrong"
in a world of uncertainty we may assume that 80 of the plaintiffs
are "in the right." This accepts the assumption that the outcome
of the group of trials defines justice. But will the right 80 win? It
would be sheer happenstance if they did. By assumption the 80
cases will look identical, so it is possible to think of the decision
process as taking blind draws from an urn that contains balls
colored to reflect the probabilities. If there are 80 red and 20 green
balls (reflecting the 80 percent chance that each case should be decided for the plaintiff) and you draw out 80 balls -(reflecting the
fact that 80 plaintiffs will prevail), you are likely to get 64 red balls
(plaintiffs who should win and did), 16 green balls (plaintiffs who
should have lost yet won), and leave 16 red balls in the urn (plaintiffs who should have won yet lost). This is not very comforting. I
have made things look worse than they need be; perhaps the legal
system is good enough to push the median of the probability distribution in each case higher and to reduce the dispersion. Then
there will be fewer mistakes. But the process will never be free of
error so long as the trial is a method of rounding to zero (loss) or
one (win) a probability that falls somewhere in between.
A different way to think about the cases is to treat each party
as entitled to the disposition afforded other litigants similarly situated. That means each party is entitled to the average outcome. If
a party is "like" another in a population that wins 60 percent of
the time, the party is "entitled" to his probability of success, not
to an actual victory or loss. The holder of a right to $1.00 if a die
comes up I to 4 (and to nothing if the roll is 5 or 6) is entitled to
$1.00 or nothing after the roll, but before the roll the holder's entitlement is worth a little less than 67 cents. That's if the holder is
risk-neutral. If the holder of the entitlement dislikes risk, then he
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would think himself better off if he could sell the entitlement for
65 cents. He would sell the entitlement for less still if he had to
pay 10 cents to roll the die, the equivalent of paying legal fees or
waiting to have a trial. The person with the right to be paid if the
roll is 1 to 4 could save the 10 cents and still be better off by accepting anything over 55 cents. The person on the other
side-obliged to pay 10 cents to roll and to pay $1.00 if the result
is 1 to 4-would think himself better off paying any sum less than
77 cents. There is obviously room to compromise without rolling
the die and to make everyone better off, all without reducing the
amount of justice in the world.
Surely, though, it is wrong to think of the legal process as the
rolling of dice. It is not random; it is deliberative and informed by
facts; and judges are constrained by rules. All true, none pertinent.
The purpose of the legal process is to classify cases correctly, according to the law and facts as we know them. The classifications
will be imprecise; It is like a postal clerk trying to sort envelopes
written by people with bad handwriting. The more astute the
clerk, the more clues he can glean from the envelopes, the more he
can send to the right destination. But some error will remain, and
no matter how careful or deliberate the process there is a
probability that an envelope will be sent to the wrong address. So
with cases. The legal system drives the median of the probability
distribution in each case toward 1.00 or 0.00 but never quite gets
there. If on average the system gets the medians only to 0.60 with
wide distributions around the medians, there will be error galore; if
it gets the medians to 0.99 with narrow distributions, there will be
very little error; the closer the medians to 1.00 or 0.00, and the
smaller the distributions, the "better" the legal system.
The success of legal rules and fact-finding processes is irrelevant to settlement because at any given level of uncertainty, parties who agree on the probable outcome may make themselves better off by settling rather than demanding a trial. If they settle in
the face of great uncertainty, we may conclude that there are serious problems with the legal system. But the problem is not the
settlement. The problem is that there may be more than one result
of litigation. The results of trials do not mimic the results that an
omniscient adjudicator would produce. That, and not the parties'
reactions to uncertainty, is the source of any perceived injustice.
Given any level of error, settlements are at least as just as the outcome of the trials. So, too, the objection to mandatory "alternative
dispute resolution" is not that it may facilitate more settlements,
but that the "alternative" processes are less successful than cur-
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rent legal procedures in separating wheat from chaff, and thus settlements in the shadow of the less accurate procedure will be less
just.4 The defect lies in depriving parties of their entitlement to an
accurate and low-cost method of resolving their disputes.5 The selection of the appropriate cost and accuracy of the dispute resolution process is independent of the desirability of settlements.
Given what they believe is the likely outcome of trial, parties can
get there quicker by settlement, avoid the rounding error, and save
the legal costs of obtaining a decision. Each party is better off, and
we should applaud a procedure that makes everyone better off
without making anyone else worse off. Settlements are desirable
not only because they "save the time of courts" (a social benefit)
but also because all parties to the settlements prefer them to the
results they anticipate obtaining from the court. Why would anyone hold the outcome of a compulsory legal proceeding to be preferable to the outcome the affected parties unanimously desire?
Whether the ethical system is based on utility, autonomy, respect,
or some variant, the result is the same: things all affected people
desire are desirable.
None of this depends on a belief that legal outcomes ought to
mimic "the market." Settlements in the shadow of the law reflect
the content of the law. The rule against trading in stocks on the
basis of material inside information reverses the results that obtained in the absence of the law. Still, if the SEC catches Ivan Boesky in the act, a settlement and consent decree can make both
better off: both avoid the protracted litigation that would eat up
much of the $100 million stake; the SEC obtains a pile of money it
can distribute, and it frees up its legal staff for other work. The
consensual disposition both enforces the legal rule and leaves benefits for the parties to share.
There is still another way to see the point. Suppose disputeresolution services were costly and almost random. Then we should
prefer settlements as a way of obtaining peace at lower cost, even
though we would deplore the fact that these settlements (like the
legal system they mirrored) would not do much for those who had
been wronged. Suppose dispute-resolution services were free and
" See Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 366, 387-89 (1986);
Jethro K. Lieberman and James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 424, 432-35, 438-39 (1986).
' Compare Albert Alschuler, Mediation With a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative
Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1808
(1986).
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perfectly accurate. Then we should prefer settlements because they
would speed up the inevitable. A party certain to win (at no cost to
himself) at trial would not settle for less, but because everyone
may want to get things out of the way a settlement may be advantageous even to the other party. Perfect justice produces perfect
settlements. What is true at the extremes is no less true for good,
but still imperfect, legal systems such as ours.
One response is to abandon the assumption that courts must
give all-or-nothing answers to legal questions. Perhaps when the
evidence is closely balanced courts should divide the stakes. In
criminal cases judges give lower sentences to defendants who have
been shown guilty under the "reasonable doubt" standard but
about whom some doubt remains. Some torts can be stated only in
probabilistic ways-the ingestion of a drug or exposure to radiation does not produce injury through any process we can identify,
but it increases the probability of injury. Perhaps the legal system
should compensate people for the change in probabilities rather
than try to determine whether a person with cancer should receive
compensation for the whole cost of the disease. But if such an approach were adopted, the benefit of settlement would remain: if
the court is going to split the difference eventually, what's wrong
with the parties splitting the difference at once and saving the
costs and emotional agony of trial?
What of precedent? Resolving disputes is only one of the two
principal functions of the legal system. The other is shaping legal
rules for use in the future.' The molding of the common law, the
construction of statutes, and so on define "the law" with which
people must comply. If every case were settled, there would be no
ongoing process of elucidation. True enough, but again not dispositive. When there are "too few precedents" uncertainty may increase, reducing the likelihood that parties will agree on the likely
disposition of the case. This in turn reduces the probability of settlement. More cases will go to judgment and produce new precedents. When there are "enough" precedents the parties will be able
to settle.7

Coleman and Silver, and Fiss (sources cited in note 3) emphasize this point, which is
also conventional in the economic analysis of law. See William M. Landes and Richard A.
Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. Legal Stud. 235, 238-40 (1979); Easterbrook,
1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 358-61 (cited in note 1).
7 There are many models of the interaction among settlement, litigation, and precedent. For example, Landes and Posner, 8 J. Legal Stud. at 259-84 (cited in note 6); George
L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. Legal Stud.
65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. Legal Stud. 51 (1977). In
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Precedents exist principally to help people conform their conduct to law. They are meant to be used. One use is in planning
conduct; another is in making amends; and another is in settling
cases. When to create a precedent and when to use existing precedents is a difficult problem but fundamentally no different from
the question when investors should seek out new information
about a stock and when they should trade at the market price. If
everyone traded at the market price all the time the price would be
unreliable, because it would not reflect the underlying values; but
as soon as the price becomes unreliable some people find it worthwhile to do more investigation and restore the accurate price that
makes uninformed trading practical.
It is difficult to say that too many cases are settled. Few of the
fully-litigated cases produce precedents. Juries decide without
stating reasons. District courts dispose of most non-jury cases
without published opinion. Of cases appealed in the federal system
and decided on the merits, more than half are handled by unpublished order.' State courts publish opinions in a lower proportion
of contested cases than do federal courts. Judges apparently believe that the existing supply of litigated cases offers more than
enough opportunities to make or embellish legal rules. And we
should not overlook the possibility that more precedents will increase rather than reduce the uncertainty in the law.'
Even if there were "too few precedents" this would not
demonstrate that settlements are unjust. To say that there are
"too few precedents" is to say that the law is obscure or, if known,
is in need of alteration. It is to say, in other words, that we either
do not know or do not approve the prevailing rules. The application of a novel rule to an existing dispute cannot confidently be
described as "more just" than the settlement of that dispute under
existing rules, and if the purpose of litigation is to clarify rather
than change the rule, then the litigation produces benefits for third
parties at the expense of the litigants who must bear the costs of
their own case. The litigation may increase social welfare, but the
parties may be excused for thinking that justice does not require
them to produce this uncompensated benefit for strangers. Litiga-

some models, litigation is portrayed as a strategic effort to distort the law. For example,
Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Relying on the Information of Interested Parties, 17 Rand
J. Econ. 18 (1986). Compare Ronald A. Heiner, Imperfect Decisions and the Law: On the
Evolution of Legal Precedents and Rules, 15 J. Legal Stud. 227 (1986).
' Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report 124 (1985).
' Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802 (1982).
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tion is subsidized in part because of the public good aspect of
precedents, but the offer of a subsidy does not compel the parties
to accept when they find themselves worse off even after taking
full advantage of the benefit.
Owen Fiss offers another reason for being wary of settlements.
He characterizes this as "imbalance of power," by which he means
that settlements reflect the parties' wealth or some variable other
than the anticipated outcome of trial. 10 If a party's wealth enables
him to wear the other side down, the argument goes, this affects
the outcome of the trial less than the outcome of the settlement.
Let us assume this is right. Nothing follows-nothing pertinent to
settlements, anyway. It is to say that given a range of outcomes in
settlements the "stronger" party will obtain an outcome at the
favorable end of the range. The "weaker" party still prefers the
settlement to the expected outcome of trial; to force him to go to
trial is to make him worse off still. If the "imbalance" is that a
plaintiff in the right is desperate for money (say, to meet medical
bills), while the defendant can afford to wait, this may reduce the
price to be paid in settlement, but a rule requiring the case to go to
trial could not make the plaintiff better off. The plaintiff's desperation comes from the delay in the legal system. If a plaintiff has a
case worth $100,000 (or a 2/3 chance of recovering $150,000) but
will die next week unless he gets $10,000 for an operation, this may
induce him to settle for $10,000-but a rule barring settlement
would leave him dead. The defendant could not be expected to
hand over the $150,000, and even $100,000 would be a settlement.
The necessitous or overmatched party is a familiar figure in contract law, and the same rules that apply to ordinary contracts
should apply to settlement contracts. We do not often patrol the
terms of contracts to reduce monopoly prices or improve the bargains adults negotiate. Perhaps we should make rights of action
more freely saleable to banks and lawyers, for this would enable
professional risk-bearers to assume the risk of litigation while paying plaintiffs their due. Claims are "sold" to insurance companies
via subrogation; attorneys can advance the medical expenses of
their clients, staving off necessitous settlements; maybe claims
should be transferrable in other ways. But this is another problem.
The proposition that the big grind down the small in litigation
also strikes a discordant note. One could put the claim the other
way around with greater support. In a suit between the penurious
o Fiss, 93 Yale L.J. at 1076-78 (cited in note 3).
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and the wealthy, money will flow in one direction only, no matter
who is in the right. The judgment-proof are plaintiffs, not defendants. Data show convincingly that the deeper the defendant's perceived pockets, the larger the plaintiff's recovery, holding gravity
of injury constant." Most statutes that authorize the award of attorneys' fees are biased in favor of plaintiffs; losing (big) defendants pay automatically, but losing plaintiffs pay rarely. The threat
of fees enhances the settlement value of the case for the plaintiffs. 2 Contingent fee contracts enable attorneys to finance suits
and assume much of the risk of failure; this facilitates litigation by
the poor against the rich but never in the opposite direction. In
many cases discovery is a lever to obtain compensation. Wealthy
defendants also have voluminous files, and a demand to search
those files imposes large costs. The defendant cannot impose
equivalent costs by asking the (small) plaintiff to search his own
records. Litigation has proven an effective strategy to impose costs
on business rivals, and it is often said (though rarely proved) that
strike suits extract decent sums from innocent parties. When the
large litigant is the government, it may have difficulty giving its
agents the right incentives (on which more below). The Tunney
Act, which established judicial supervision of consent decrees in
antitrust litigation, stemmed from concern that the government
was giving away the store, 3 and many people think that criminal
plea bargains offer scandalously low sentences to guilty people who
have no discernable way to put the government over a barrel. 4
The picture one draws from all of this is not the big beating up the
small in settlements or litigation as a whole.
Settlements therefore fare well-better than other contracts,
because the settlement contract reflects the likely outcome of a

" See Audrey Chin and Mark A. Peterson, Deep Pockets, Empty Pockets: Who Wins in
Cook County Jury Trials 43, table 4.5 (Rand Inst. for Civil Justice 1985), showing that after
establishing a defendant's negligent maintenance of property a civil plaintiff collects, on
average, $37,000 from a person, $98,000 from a governmental agency, and $161,000 from a
corporation. See also James K. Hammitt, Stephen J. Carroll and David A. Relles, Tort Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J. Legal Stud. 751 (1985); Wittman, 29 J.L. & Econ. at 156
(cited in note 1).
12 Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S. Ct. 1531, 1539 n.20, 1541, 1545 (1986). See also Geoffrey
P.
Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. Legal Stud. 93 (1986).
11See Ronald G. Carr, Some Observations on the Tunney Act, 52 Antitrust L.J. 953
(1983); Janet L. McDavid, William A. Sankbeil, Edward C. Schmidt and Barry J. Brett,

Antitrust Consent Decrees: Ten Years' Experience Under the Tunney Act, 52 Antitrust L.J.
883 (1983); Note, The Scope of Judicial Review of Consent Decrees Under the Antitrust
Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 153 (1983).
14 A proposition that I have disputed, see Easterbrook, 12 J. Legal Stud. at 309-16
(cited in note 1), but a common belief all the same.
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process that vindicates legal entitlements. The picture becomes
more complex when the settlement takes the form of a judicial decree. This is not because judges aren't entitled to become involved
in private orderings or extended disputes. 15 Bankruptcy proceedings may last for a decade or more, yet they are largely about solving complex disputes under private contracts. The construction or
enforcement of contracts is a mainstay of litigation, and it does not
become suspect just because the contract is born in court instead
of being fetched there. It is because consent decrees often are
designed to affect the rights of strangers. Plaintiffs may negotiate
on behalf of a class, unions on behalf of members, and attorneys
for the executive branch on behalf of the legislative branch or the
future. When the legitimacy of a decision rests on consent, the authority to give consent is of great moment. Professor Fiss and several other participants in this symposium express concern that
consent may not be authoritative. 6 I share the concern.
II
Lawyers who negotiate consent decrees are agents of the parties. The parties may be agents in turn. The managers of corporations are agents of investors; union officials are agents of workers;
the representatives in class actions are agents of the class; holders
of public office are agents of the branch of government they represent and indirectly of the people who elected them. Agents have
private agendas, which may include personal goals (from political
objectives to leisure) that conflict with their principals' interests.
The costs of this divergence of interest inhere in any agency relationship, but there are palliatives. Corporate officers may hold
stock in the firms they manage, and the value of this stock (and
their bonuses) depends in part on their performance. Lawyers are
interested in their reputations, which affect the fees for their services and the likelihood of repeat business. These and other devices align the interests of principals and agents, so that they flour15 This is one of Fiss's objections to settlements. See Fiss, 93 Yale L.J. at 1082-85 (cited
in note 3).
"eFiss, 93 Yale L.J. at 1078-82 (cited in note 3); Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees

Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting Third Parties, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 103,
104; Charles J. Cooper, The Collateral Attack Doctrine and the Rules of Intervention: A
Judicial Pincer Movement on Due Process, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 155, 156-57; Michael W.
McConnell, Why Have Elections? Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Policies from Political
Change, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 295, 303-304; Judith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. Chi.
Legal F. 43, 70-71.
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ish or suffer together. When the interest-alignment devices are
weak, there is cause for concern.
The representative of a class may be a poor agent, because any
one member's stakes are much less than those of the class as a
whole. The representative may settle for too little (or for ideological reasons may hold out for too much). Lawyers for a class (or in a
shareholders' derivative suit) may settle in exchange for high legal
fees and little relief, or may not conscientiously press for the terms
best for the class, or may find that what is best for the class is not
best for the representative plaintiff. The lawyers' reward (legal
fees) is not well aligned with the plaintiffs' interest (the merits of
the case). 17 But all of this is old hat, as are the devices used to deal
with divergence of interest. These include each class member's
right to opt out of a suit for damages, judicial review of any settlement, and the requirement that the members of the class have
identical interests and that the representative plaintiffs (and their
lawyers) be adequate to the task. These devices may work well or
poorly, and they work less well with respect to settlements than
they do with respect to dispositions on the merits, but there is
nothing novel here and nothing to suggest that consent decrees
pose greater risks than settlements that do not end in judicial
decrees.
Sometimes, however, the purpose of entering a consent decree
is to affect third parties, those not represented even in principle. A
union may settle a case on terms that affect people who are not yet
employees or who are employees but not members of the union.
Officials of the Executive Branch of a government may consent to
a decree that affects the powers of their successors or of the Legislative Branch. When the parties adversely affected by the decree
are willing to bear the costs, they may attack it just as they could a
private contract. 8 The analogy to contract prevents treating the
decree as an authoritative expression of legal entitlements. The
settlement and consent decree are neither better nor worse than,

17 See Kirchoff v. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320, 324-26 (7th Cir. 1986). See also John C. Coffee,
Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669
(1986); Andrew Rosenfield, An Empirical Test of Class-Action Settlement, 5 J. Legal Stud.
113 (1976).
8 See Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3079-80 (1986), holding
that consent decrees do not bind parties who withhold their consent and may be challenged
by nonparties in the same way a contract may be challenged. See also Evans v. Jeff D., 106
S. Ct. 1531, 1537 (1986); Comment, Collateral Attacks on Employment Discrimination Consent Decrees, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 147 (1986). As the remainder of this essay shows, I agree
with Coleman and Silver, Laycock, McConnell, and Cooper that a party should not be able
to do by consent decree what he may not do by contract.
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say, a collective bargaining agreement that affects people who do
not belong to the union. Efforts to do more through consent decrees should be rebuffed. 9
One should not overstate the parties' ability to affect others.
Professor Laycock expresses concern that employers will settle discrimination litigation by selling out their employees.2 0 Laycock
gives us a picture of an employer-threatened with exposure to
large back pay awards to applicants-who satisfies the applicants'
claims by giving them preference in employment over existing
workers or other applicants. This is said to be free to the employer,
costly to the unrepresented employees. Not so. The employer and
employees have a long-term relation, and the employee must receive the market price of his work. If the employer imposes on the
employee onerous conditions, such as exposure to a greater risk of
layoff, the employer must pay in higher wages; if the employer
hires as new employees people whose skills are not at the level of
the old, the employer is paying the same money for less work and
again pays for the decree. To see the point clearly, suppose an employer that had lost a discrimination case proposed to raise the
money to pay the plaintiffs by reducing the wages of existing employees 10 percent. Would this remedy come solely at the expense
of the employees? If the employer was formerly paying the competitive wage, it could not get away with the reduction (without
losing its good employees, those with opportunities elsewhere). If
the employer was formerly paying more than the market wage, it
might be able to make the 10 percent reduction-but then it could
have made the reduction with or without the need to pay damages.
The employer could have reduced the wages and kept the money,
but for the need to pay it to the plaintiffs. In either case, the employer bears most of the cost of the judgment, even though the
money nominally comes from the employees. So too with arrangements that involve making employees worse off but do not change
their money wage. The employer must either raise the money wage
to compensate employees or forego an opportunity to reduce the
wage to the market level. Of course, the employer may strike a deal
under which only new employees are adversely affected by the con-

" A point that I have made in a different forum and do not elaborate here. See Kasper
v. Board of Election Commissioners, 814 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1987); Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d
555 (7th Cir. 1986); Samayoa v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 807 F.2d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 1986);
compare Morgan v. South Bend Community School Corp., 797 F.2d 471, 477-78 (7th Cir.
1986). See also Secretary of Labor v. Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d 682, 695-97 (7th Cir. 1986) (en
banc).
20 Laycock, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 115-116 (cited in note 16).
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sent decree. Then it is crystal clear that the employer is dealing
with its own money. The deal is like the two-tier wage system now
in use at some airlines, in which new hires make less than existing
employees doing the same jobs. An employee who accepts the
lower tier gets the market wage; there is no way the employer can
pay less, whether the lower tier gets a lower salary or a greater
possibility of layoff because of a consent decree. Many consent decrees that appear to create third-party effects therefore do not, because the "third-parties" are in privity with the parties to the decree. When they are, the Coase Theorem tells us, their private
bargains will eliminate the "externalities."2 1
When the consent is given by an official of the government,
however, no one may have the interest or the authority to challenge the decree. The executive officials cannot engage in side bargains with other affected people. What "internalizes" the effects in
the employer-employee case is an adjustment in wages or an alteration in who works for whom. There are no similar adjustments
inside the government-at least no lawful ones. (We call the remaining ones bribes.) Sometimes adjustments are not possible
even through side payments. Legislative officials cannot block consents given by executive officials in charge of litigation, and the
successors of these officials (legislative and executive alike) are unknown and cannot participate in the bargaining. The concern
about the use of consent decrees should be greatest when the devices that cause parties to take account of third party effects are
weakest.
The separation of powers inside a government-and each official's concern that he may be replaced by someone with a different
agenda-creates incentives to use the judicial process to obtain an
advantage. The consent decree is an important element in the
strategy.2 2 Officials of an environmental agency who believe that
the regulations they inherited from their predecessors are too
stringent may quickly settle a case brought by industry (as officials
who think the regulations are not stringent enough may settle a
case brought by a conservation group). A settlement under which
the agency promulgated new regulations would last only for the
duration of the incumbent official; a successor with a different view
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of
Public Institutions, 1983 Duke L.J. 1265, 1294-95; Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 360-61
(1981) (Brennan, J., concurring). But see Chicago & Railway Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339,
345 (1892).
21

22 See
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could promulgate a new regulation. Both parties to the litigation
therefore may want a judicial decree that ties the hands of the successor. It is impossible for an agency to promulgate a regulation
containing a clause such as "My successor cannot amend this regulation." But if the clause appears in a consent decree, perhaps the
administrator gets his wish to dictate the policies of his successor.
Similarly, officials of the executive branch may obtain leverage
over the legislature. If prison officials believe their budget is too
small, they may consent to a judgment that requires larger prisons,
and then take the judgment to the legislature to obtain the funds
(the alternative is a jail delivery).23 The rules against sham litigation do not control these practices. It is not a sham for the executive branch to consent to relief when existing practices are illegal
or unconstitutional, and a court cannot separate the appropriate
consents from the politically motivated ones without deciding the
cases on the merits.
There are safety valves. One is that a change in the legislation
on which the suit was founded requires the consent decree to be
reopened or set aside; another is the willingness of courts to modify decrees based on changes of circumstance; a third is collateral
attack by affected third parties.24 None is wholly satisfactory, because each supposes that the consent decree accurately reflects the
existing legal entitlements, that it is like a plea of guilty, that its
authority comes from "law" rather than from consent. Thus courts
say that there must be a change in law or circumstance-an important one at that-to justify a change in the decree.2 5 Many courts
put hurdles in the path of collateral attack by third parties.26 If it
22 The strategy does not depend on settlement. Officials may roll over and play dead

when sued, hoping that the court will enter a judgment from which they will not appeal. In
one case senior military officials tried to undermine a statute by testifying that there was no
military need for what Congress had done and then, when the court held the statute unconstitutional because it served no military purpose, recommending no appeal. (The Solicitor
General nonetheless directed that the case be appealed, and the case became moot when
Congress repealed the statute.) But this essay is about consent judgments, so I do not press
the point.
24 See Williams v. Atkins, 786 F.2d 457 (1st Cir. 1986) (collecting cases dealing with
changes in legislation); Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1985) (collecting cases dealing
with changes in circumstance); Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in Institutional
Reform Litigation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1020 (1986); Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900,
901-02 (1983) (Rehnquist and Brennan, JJ., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (discussing the scope of collateral attack); United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511
(11th Cir. 1983) (same); Comment, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 147 (cited in note 18).
22 See, for example, Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1578-80 (2d Cir. 1985); Citizens
for Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
2 See generally Cooper, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 156 n.4 (cited in note 16) and Laycock,
1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 119 (cited in note 16).
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is consent and not the merits of the case that validates a consent
decree, however, that has implications for altering or reopening
decrees.
To take seriously the proposition that the decree depends on
consent is to require a court to ask whether the consent was authoritative. If a class representative consents to a judgment or dismissal, that is not authoritative because the representative may
not speak for the absent members; the "settlement" sets the stage
for a judicial inquiry into the merits of the case; even then objecting class members may be allowed to opt out, and the resulting
judgment will be worthless if the representative was not a faithful
champion.17 If a lawyer settles a case without the consent of his
client, the settlement will be undone. So too with other agents.
The logical question is whether a person making a contractual undertaking to settle a case has the authority to enter into the contract. If he does, the consent is effective. If he does not, the noncontract does not get any additional force by being filed with a
court. This assimilates the law of contracts and consent decrees;
consent plays the same role in each, and defenses to contracts become grounds on which to reopen or alter decrees.2
A government may change the rules. One legislature may undo
the work of an earlier legislature; an administrator may repeal the
regulations of his predecessor."' A pledge by the sitting administrator of the EPA never to revise a regulation would be ineffectual.
Many acts are out of bounds to the executive branch-from seizing
steel mills without statutory authority to pledging the payment of
money without an appropriation to promulgating "irrevocable"

17 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950); Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119 (1977). See also Kenneth W. Dam, Class
Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. Legal Stud. 47,
56-61 (1975).
28 I have not overlooked the possibility that the court's approval of the decree resolves
questions of authority to contract, precluding later denials by those who sign the decree. See
Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Commonwealth of Pa., 755 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1985). This
is a misuse of principles of preclusion. Those who sign the decree have no incentive to challenge their own authority, and it should not be possible for a faithless agent who lacks
authority to bind the principal by the expedient of neglecting to point out his own inability
to act. Principles of preclusion do not apply unless the litigants have an incentive to litigate
an issue; here they do not. See Morgan v. South Bend Community School Corp., 797 F.2d
471, 477-78 (7th Cir. 1986) (disagreeing with Delaware Valley). See also United States v.
Beebe, 180 U.S. 343, 351-55 (1901); Stone v. Bank of Commerce, 174 U.S. 412 (1899); United
States v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 571 F.2d 1283, 1287 (4th Cir. 1978).
2' Wilbur v. United States, 281 U.S. 206, 217 (1930); Antonin Scalia, The Role of the
Judiciary in Deregulation, 55 Antitrust L.J. 191 (1986).
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regulations. These rules serve some important purposes. They preserve the character of a republican government by allowing today's
majorities to work their will; they recognize the fact that executive
officials have a temporally limited mandate. If restraints on the
power of the executive to bind the government are desirable-and
I am assuming that without independent inquiry-then these restraints must be reflected in the power to contract in or out of
litigation.
This is not to say that all exercises of governmental power
lapse with the term of the officeholder. Some acts are final in the
sense of once-for-all; a pardon has this quality. Some acts are
locked in by the Constitution. A promise of immunity from prosecution, in exchange for incriminatory testimony, is made binding
by Constitution and statute alike. Some acts have extended duration because that duration has been authorized. Executive officials
may sign long-term contracts for the building of aircraft carriers,
contracts that expose the government to damages if cancelled.
Some decisions have extended life because of procedures that retard change. A valid regulation may be revoked or altered only by
the same procedures-and with the same support-that is necessary for a new regulation.30 On the other hand, executive officials
do not have actual authority to waive the polity's immunity from
suit, to promise to act at variance with statutes, to pledge that the
President will support or sign legislation, or to curtail the discretion of their successors, however much they would love to. All of
these rules depend on remembering that the officeholders in the
government are agents, and temporary ones at that. Natural people can speak for their own future; the time limits imposed on officeholders are designed in part to prevent them from guiding the
polity's behavior for more than a few years, and the substantive
constraints on their discretion reflect internal apportionment of
powers among officeholders. The question in each case is one of
authority. The power of any governmental official is determined by
the domestic law of his jurisdiction, and officials in some states
may have more extensive powers than federal officials.3 1
30 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); Scalia, 55
Antitrust L.J. at 192 (cited in note 29); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look
Doctrine, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. 177.
31 But compare Charles River Bridge Co. v. Warren Bridge Co., 36 U.S. 420 (1837);
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. A., T. & S. Fe
Ry., 470 U.S. 451 (1985); Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec., 106 S. Ct. 2390
(1986). It has been a long time since Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819),
and Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810), were leading cases.
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The duration of official acts varies with the nature of the act
and the need to have long-term commitments in order to carry on
the business of government. These limits exist independent of the
form in which the government's action is to be pledged. The question here is whether there is any reason why things should be different if the action is -pledged in a consent decree. One reason
might be that decrees offer a place in which officials may pledge to
administer their statutes properly. This is not a difference, however. Each officeholder can "do right"--and if that means doing
what the plaintiffs want, the officeholder can do it and moot the
litigation. If the decree promises compliance with the law, then the
law is itself the source of obligation to adhere to the decree; if the
decree promises more, then the difference must be justified as a
contractual pledge.
By and large even authorized contracts may not be specifically
enforced against governments.32 The remedy is a suit for damages
for breach of contract, perhaps for a "taking" if the contract establishes property rights. To the extent a consent decree promises
specific performance as the remedy for breach, this too is problematic. If a contract with the government fails, the remedy is either
damages (if a valid contract was broken) or nothing. "Nothing"
here means a vacation of the decree and a restoration of the suit,
which may proceed to judgment.33 Perhaps a consent decree entered in excess of authority (and promising specific performance if
there is a breach) could be enforced under the rubric of "estoppel
of the government." The Supreme Court has not held that estoppel is possible, however, and it has concluded that if estoppel is
available the minimum requirements include affirmative misconduct and detrimental reliance. 4 This would mean a serious diminution in the ability to litigate the case if it should be reopened.
A second line of argument is that settlement is good in its own
right. The arguments developed in Part I of this essay have led
courts as well as parties to prefer settlement to litigation. The
greater the parties' leeway to strike bargains, the more cases can be
2 See Sharp v. Weinberger, 798 F.2d 1521, 1523-24 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.).

" See Newport News Shipbuilding, 571 F.2d at 1283 (vacating an unauthorized settlement). Compare United States v. 119.67 Acres of Land, 663 F.2d 1328, 1336-37 (5th Cir.
1981) (holding a settlement effective because specifically authorized by statute); Alliance to
End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (reading a consent decree to allow the executive branch to change its regulations, thereby avoiding the
question).
"' Heckler v. Community Health Service, 467 U.S. 51 (1984); United States v. Medico
Industries, Inc., 784 F.2d 840, 845-46 (7th Cir. 1986).
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resolved amicably. If, on the other hand, the executive branch cannot bind the future and can walk away from consent decrees (in
the absence of authority to make contracts about regulations), settlement would be less attractive to plaintiffs. So, the argument
would conclude, the executive branch must be free in litigation to
make promises sufficient to settle cases effectually.3 5 This is a non
sequitur. Contracts of all sorts are favored, but restrictions on the
power to contract serve purposes of their own. For example, an
agent usually needs actual authority to bind the principal. The
benefits of contract as an institution do not imply that these restrictions are to be overridden. If an agent could commit the principal without authority, contracts would become even harder to negotiate, because principals would appoint fewer agents and keep
them on shorter leashes.
The existence of a good end does not imply much about
means. If the executive branch could draw on the Treasury without
an appropriation, that would facilitate settlements; if the executive
branch could promise not to enforce valid statutes, or vary the
terms of statutes, that would facilitate settlements; if the executive
branch could sign away the rights of unrepresented parties, that
too would facilitate settlements. The list can be extended, all without implying anything about which of these limits on authority
should be relaxed in the course of litigation. The status of decrees
as contracts cuts both ways. Treating decrees as contracts enables
defendants to offer relief that a court could not order and that
plaintiffs may greatly prefer.3 6 It is hard to have things both ways;
if contractual analogies work to plaintiffs' favor they may work the
other way too; legal rules do not depend on which side of the contest reaps the benefit.
If the "attraction" of the decree comes from an unauthorized
source, a diminution in its attractiveness is hardly objectionable.
We have a complex of rules that determine when one person may
bind another. If these rules preclude the adoption of favorable contracts, they should be changed rather than ignored in the course of
litigation; if the rules are desirable, they should apply to consent
decrees as well as to other contracts. So if it is a good idea that
people be forbidden to sell their children into slavery, it remains a
good idea even if the parents propose to do so to settle litigation. If
it is a good idea that executive officials be able to contract only
*5 See, for example, Badgley v. Santacroce, 800 F.2d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1986).
6 Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
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when they have actual authority to do so, it remains a good idea
when they propose to settle litigation.
One could argue that the judicial scrutiny preceding approval
of the consent decree should enlarge the set of permissible contractual choices. Maybe we ban certain contracts only because we fear
they will be adopted improvidently, and judicial examination is a
substitute for the prudence of the contracting parties.3 7 This is an
implausible approach to consent decrees, however, because when
the parties settle a case they will not present the judge with the
information necessary to enable him to make a judgment about the
prudence of the agreement. No external review is available. On top
of that, many restrictions on the ability to contract have nothing to
do with paternalistic fears of imprudent behavior. They have to do
with effects on third parties or on future officeholders. These officeholders are not identifiable even in principle. Elections are unpredictable a few months in advance; consent decrees attempt to
govern longer periods. The approval of unidentified voters and officeholders cannot be obtained directly or vicariously through the
judge. (It would be weird to portray the judge as a stand-in for
future politicians.) The judge cannot easily look out for these third
parties, because they will be unrepresented and often will be
unidentifiable. Judicial scrutiny of consent decrees therefore is not
a good reason to enlarge the set of permitted choices.
Then there is 28 U.S.C. § 518, which authorizes the Attorney
General to control the litigation of the United States. Professor
Shane believes that Section 518 supplies the authority to make
pledges in settlement.3 Yet all Section 518 does is name the Attorney General as the official responsible for conducting the litigation
of the United States. It controls the who, and not the what, of litigation. Neither the text nor the history of this statute suggests
that the Attorney General may make in the course of litigation
binding commitments that the executive branch as a whole lacks
the power to make outside of litigation.
Ultimately there is no good reason to allow consent decrees to
make binding promises that exceed the authority the parties would
have in the absence of litigation. This is a minority view so far.
The unwillingness of courts to take seriously the contractual basis
" Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 306-07 (7th Cir. 1986), discusses one statute that puts certain contracts (to work for less than the minimum wage) off
limits yet authorizes settlements that may pay less than the minimum wage. The rationale
is that the Secretary of Labor must approve the settlement. The Secretary's review adds a
layer of scrutiny that is missing when parties fully control their own litigation.
11 Peter M. Shane, Federal Policy Making by Consent Decree: An Analysis of Agency
and Judicial Discretion, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 241, 254.
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of consent judgments has led the Department of Justice, which
controls litigation against the United States, to forbid settlements
that pledge the government to promulgate or maintain regulations. 9 By putting a category of settlements off limits, these regulations make consent decrees even less "attractive" than would a
rule allowing the government to settle but reserving the executive
branch's ability to change the rules and resume the litigation.
If the option of binding decrees is unavailable (when binding
contracts are unavailable), the principal alternatives are litigating
the case to judgment and temporary cessation of hostilities. The
defendants may change their practices to plaintiffs' satisfaction
even though they cannot commit their successors to follow the
same policies. This may not make the case moot, but it could make
litigation unnecessary (from the plaintiffs' perspective) or improvident (from the courts'). 0 The favorable exercise of discretion may
be all the plaintiffs wanted or could hope to receive. This puts litigants on a par with others who seek to influence administrative
conduct. A person who persuades the FDA during rule making that
a statute requires a particular outcome may find that the agency
later changes its mind. Those who obtain laws through political
muscle know that legislation and regulations are rented, not
bought. So it is with regulations or administrative actions obtained
by persuading an official that the statute requires a particular disposition. Tomorrow's officeholder may conclude that today's is
wrong, and there is no reason why embedding the regulation in a
consent decree should immunize it from reexamination when embedding it in C.F.R. does not.
The search for consent also informs the process of revising existing consent decrees. These decrees may be long-term relational
contracts, much as twenty-year pacts between electric utilities and
coal producers establish frameworks for bargaining and do not resolve all hard issues. 41 If some fundamental supposition of the contract breaks down, there may be nothing to do except dissolve the
3' Memorandum from Attorney General Edwin Meese III to all Assistant Attorneys
General and all United States Attorneys Re: Department Policy Regarding Consent Decrees
and Settlement Agreements (March 13, 1986), reprinted in Review of Nixon Presidential
Material Access Regulations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Government Information,
Justice, and Agriculture of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 182 (1986), reprinted in part in 54 U.S.L.W. 2492 (April 1, 1986).
40 Compare Chicago Teachers Union, Local Number 1 v. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. 1066, 1075
n.14 (1986), with Watkins v. Blinzinger, 789 F.2d 474, 483-84 (7th Cir. 1986).
41 See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets,
Relational Contracting (1985); Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-Burning Electric Generating Plants, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 33 (1985).
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relation, which means restoring the case to the docket for trial.42 If
the dispute concerns smaller, unanticipated matters, the court acts
more as mediator than adjudicator. The court properly asks
whether if this were a private contractual dispute the contract
should be avoided or interpreted, and if interpreted how much leeway the adjudicator possesses. What could not be justified as interpretation of a contract also may not be justified as modification of
a decree, but the line between reformation and interpretation of a
relational contract is not easy to draw. The answer will be found in
the nature of the relationship rather than in abstract principles.

42 United States v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 799 F.2d 281, 297-98 (7th Cir.

1986).

